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THE ROAD TO REASON: ARIZONA V. GANT
AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
DOCTRINE
Myron Moskouitz*
Officer Copp arrests Dan in his bedroom, handcuffs Dan,
takes him out of the room, and locks him in a patrol car. Then
Copp returns to the bedroom and searches the room. The officer
has no search warrant, no probable cause to believe there is evi-
dence in the room, and no reason to believe that some confede-
rate might dispose of evidence in the room. Is the search valid?
Change the facts slightly. Dan is in the driver's seat of a
car when arrested, then cuffed and locked in the patrol car.
May Copp now return to Dan's car and search it-with no war-
rant, no probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of a
crime, and no danger that the car will be driven off?
Until recently, many courts have answered "yes" to both
questions-solely because the search occurred soon after an ar-
rest and near the place of arrest.! Several commentators (in-
cluding this one) have objected to these results, with little effect.
Now, however, Arizona u. Gant offers some hope that rea-
son will replace dogma as the basis of the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine, and put some sensible limits on its scope.2
I. IN THE BEGINNING: CHIMEL
The trouble started with a landmark case, Chimel u. Cali-
fornia,3 which is generally known for its careful reasoning.4
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. This article is adapted from the James
Otis Lecture, delivered by Professor Moskovitz at the Universit of Mississippi School of
Law in November of 2008.
I See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 n.3 (2009).
2 Cant, 129 S. Ct. 1710.
3 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
• I summarized Chimel more thoroughly in Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search ofa
Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of ChimeI and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 658-
62 (2002).
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Chimel held that an arrest justifies a warrantless search be-
cause the arrest might cause the arrestee to attack the arresting
officer or dispose of evidence.5 These two justifications limit the
scope of the search to areas in which the arrestee might reach
for a weapon or evidence. These justifications permit the officer
to search the clothing worn by the arrestee, but not the area
beyond where he might reach or lunge. So far, so good-this
limitation on scope fits perfectly with the Court's justifications
for this exception to the search warrant "requirement." But the
Court also indicated that the justifications allow the police to
search within the lunge area.6 Therein lies the problem.
The Court assumed that the police arrest Dan while he is
standing on a certain spot, then calculate the area into which he
might reach, and-while Dan stands on that spot-search that
area (including the insides of any drawers or other containers
within that area). It never occurred to the Court that-in the
real world-Dan will be nowhere near the spot of arrest when
the search occurs. Immediately after arresting Dan, the police
will usually handcuff him, remove him from the spot, and lock
him in their patrol car. But then-relying on Chimel's dictum-
might return to the spot and search the lunge area.?
Since Chimel, most lower courts have not cared that Dan is
no longer at the spot of arrest when the police search the lunge
area-the search of that area is fine even if Dan is long gone.
The Supreme Court has spoken, and that's good enough for
them. If pressed, some courts would concoct a new rationale for
this strange stretch of the Chimel rationale. For example, the
police were justified in removing Dan from the spot for their
own safety, so they should not forfeit their "right" to search the
area without a warrane
None of this made any sense to me, but my job nevertheless
compelled me to explain it to a pack of wide-eyed, innocent law
students year after year. I found myself embarrassed by the
judicial system I was urging my pupils to respect. What to do?
5 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
• Id. at 763.
7 Id.
S See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Maybe I could shake up the courts by proving to them that
Chimel's premise was simply wrong: cops do not let Dan stand
there while they search the area.
So I did a study. I asked police departments around the
country what they tell their officers to do with the suspect after
an arrest. The response was pretty much unanimous: "Cuff him
and get him out of there." I reported my findings in a law re-
view article.9 Unlike most articles, this one seemed to have
some effect on the Supreme Court. The mental meanderings of
law professors only occasionally influence the Court, but the
Justices pay more attention to facts shown by empirical re-
search.
More on that later. First, let's review the effect of Chimel's
mistake on car searches.
II. CAR SEARCHES-BELTON & THORNTON
In New York v. Belton, the arrestee was outside his car
when he was arrested, along with his three passengers. IO The
officer then searched the car, finding cocaine in the pocket of a
black leather jacket on the back seat.ll
The situation was unusual. The single officer was outnum-
bered by the four detainees, and he might not have had room for
all of them in his patrol car. So he left them where they were
when they were arrested, and probably called for back-up to
help take them in. Applying Chimel's logic, the Court should
have allowed the officer to search the lunge area, which may-
or may not-have included the back seat of the car and the
jacket pocket.
But-held the Court-why bother with all this work, when
a single "bright line" rule will do the trick: arrest a "recent oc-
cupant" of a car, and you can automatically search the entire
passenger compartment and all containers that happen to be
there. Why? Largely because "articles inside the relatively nar-
row compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile
9 Moskovitz, supra note 4, at 663-70.
10 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
II [d. at 456.
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are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evi-
dentiary ite[m] .',,12
My study showed that this premise was pretty far off the
mark. Articles in the passenger compartment are not generally
within the area an arrestee might grab, because when the
search occurs, the arrestee is almost always firmly sequestered
in the back of the patrol car.13
Dissenting in Belton, Justice Brennan protested that this
"single familiar standard" was at odds with Chimel's case-by-
case approach. 14 A plethora of professors agreed with Brennan,
to no avail. I5
In Thornton v. United States, the Court reaffirmed Belton's
broad rule.16 While driving an unmarked police car, Officer Ni-
chols learned that Thornton was driving a car whose tags did
not match the car to which the tags had been issued. Thornton
parked and left the car. Nichols "accosted" Thornton, who con-
sented to a search of his person, which revealed marijuana and
cocaine. I? Nichols arrested Thornton, handcuffed him, and
placed him in the patrol car. The officer then searched Thorn-
ton's car, finding a handgun.18
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion held that the
search of the car was incident to the arrest and therefore valid.19
Thornton had argued that because the officer in Belton had "in-
itiated contact" with the suspects while they were in the car, the
police may search the car incident to arrest of a recent occupant
only where this fact is present.20 But in Thornton, Rehnquist's
opinion held that this fact played no role in the Belton opinion.21
12 [d. at 460 (citation omitted).
13 Moskovitz, supra note 4, at 675-76.
14 "When the arrest has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into cus-
tody, the justifications underlying Chimel's limited exception to the warrant require-
ment cease to apply: at that point there is no possibility that the arrestee could reach
weapons or contraband." [d. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
16 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
17 [d. at 617-18.
18 [d.
19 [d. at 619.
20 [d. at 620-21.
21 [d.
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Therefore, "Belton governs even when an officer does not make
contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle."22 Why?
"The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers
and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or
were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment,
justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated."23
Thus, Thornton confirms the Belton rule: A police officer
may search the car of a "recent occupant" incident to arrest even
if the suspect is nowhere near the car when the search takes
place-for "officer safety" and to prevent destruction of evidence.
This, I believe, is ridiculous. Neither of these dangers is in fact
present if the suspect is nowhere near the car when the search
occurs.
Justice Scalia concurred. He rejected three arguments that
tried to squeeze the search into Chimel's justifications.24
First, in this case, could Thornton himself-at the time of
the search-have reached into the car for a weapon or evidence?
No. Unless Thornton was "possessed of the skill of Houdini
and the strength of Hercules,"25 the likelihood was minimal
that he could have wriggled out of his handcuffs, leapt out of the
squad car, and reached into his own car for a weapon or evi-
dence-all before Officer Nichols could stop him. If such a dan-
ger was substantial, then there was an equal likelihood that
Chimel could have escaped his captors and run upstairs to grab
a weapon or evidence-but the Court in Chimel refused to allow
a search of the upstairs incident to the downstairs arrest.26
Second, should there be a general rule "entitling" the police
to search a car incident to a valid arrest? No, the Fourth
Amendment is not a game where the police "win" the right to
search. Warrantless searches must be justified by some identi-
fied need.
Third, is Belton's general rule justified by dangers generally
occurring in the real world, so a general rule permitting such
22 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
23 [d. at 622-23.
.. [d. at 625-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2S [d. at 626 (quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973)).
'" Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
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searches should apply even in a small minority of cases where
those dangers are not present? No, in the real world there is
usually no danger, because police are trained to get the arrestee
away from the car before searching. Justice Scalia cited my
study to support this last point.27
According to Scalia, Belton's rationale is wrong, but not its
rule-at least in part.28 Apparently impelled somewhat by stare
decisis, Scalia would not overrule Belton but would instead "re-
cast" the case with a new rationale (never mentioned in Belton
itself): "the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for
which he was arrested."29 Why? Scalia harks back to a couple of
pre-Chimel cases30 that justified area searches incident to arrest
by "a more general interest in gathering evidence relevant to
the crime for which the suspect has been arrested.'>3l Scalia re-
justifies this basis:
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a crime
is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest distin-
guishes the arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a
search for evidence of his crime from general rummaging.
Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime
is most likely to be found where the suspect was appre-
hended.32
But so what? If there is no danger that the arrestee (or
someone else) might remove this evidence before the officer can
obtain a search warrant, why not require the officer to go
through the usual procedure of presenting his justification to a
magistrate first? Scalia might have (but did not) invoked the
reasoning of cases endorsing the "automobile exception" to the
warrant requirement. In United States v. Chadwick, for exam-
Z7 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628 (citing Moskovitz, supra note 4, at 665-66).
28 [d. at 629.
29 [d.
30 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947).
31 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629.
32 [d. at 630.
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pIe, the Court held that because of the low (but not non-
existent) expectation of privacy in a car, if the officer has proba-
ble cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in parts of a car,
the officer may search those parts.33 He needs no search war-
rant and no exigent circumstances preventing him from getting
a warrant before the evidence might be removed or destroyed.34
This low expectation of privacy also supports Scalia's new rule,
arguably-at least insofar as it applies to car searches incident
to arrest.
Has Scalia's new rule added anything to the automobile ex-
ception? That is, are there circumstances where the automobile
exception would not apply but Scalia's "recasted" Belton rule
would authorize the search? It seems so. Scalia would permit a
search of an arrestee's car "where it is reasonable to believe evi-
dence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the ve-
hicle.,,35 If Scalia intended to add something to the auto excep-
tion (even though he failed to discuss that exception), then it
must be this: "reasonable to believe" means something less than
probable cause. Scalia must have intended this, because he
never uses the familiar term probable cause in his concurrence.
How much less? We get some hint from Scalia's application
of his new rule to the facts of Thornton. Because Thornton was
arrested for a drug offense, "It was reasonable for Officer Ni-
chols to believe that further contraband or similar evidence re-
levant to the crime for which he had been arrested might be
found in the vehicle from which he had just alighted and which
was still within his vicinity at the time of arrest.'>'l6
Was there probable cause to believe there were drugs in the
car? Well, Officer Nichols had found three bags of marijuana
and "a large amount" of cocaine in Thornton's pockets when he
arrested Thornton, and Thornton had just been driving the car.3?
So Thornton might well be a drug dealer, and he might have
been storing more drugs in the car. But maybe he kept them all
33 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
34 [d. at 22.
35 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632.
,. [d.
37 [d. at 618 (plurality opinion).
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in his pockets. Probable cause? Tough question, but Scalia did
not even bother to address it. Pretty strong evidence that Jus-
tice Scalia did not mean to equate "reasonable to believe" with
probable cause.
I suspect that he meant "reason to believe" to mean some-
thing like the reasonable suspicion needed to justify a Terry-
stop--more than a mere hunch, but less than probable cause.3S
If probable cause means something like a 51% chance that X is
true, then reasonable suspicion means something like a 25%
chance. That is probably what Scalia meant, and that is proba-
bly what future cases will hold.
Could the "reason to believe" flow from facts other than the
nature of the crime for which the suspect was arrested? (Scalia
does not address this.) I cannot see why not.
So why am I bothering to spend so much time on a concur-
rence? Well, this concurrence seemed very likely to command a
majority of the Court, eventually, because Justice Ginsburg
(from the left) signed on to Scalia's concurrence, and Justice
O'Connor (from the center) wrote her own concurring opinion
pretty much endorsing Scalia's.39
And that is just what happened in Gant: the majority
adopted the rule proposed by Scalia in Thornton.
III. ARIZONA V. GANT
Officers knew that a warrant had been issued to arrest
Gant for driving with a suspended license.4o They saw Gant
drive into a driveway, then get out of his car.41 Officer Griffith
was thirty feet from Gant when he called to Gant.42 Theyap-
proached each other, meeting ten to twelve feet from Gant's
car.43 Griffith arrested Gant, handcuffed him, and locked him in
the backseat of a patrol car.44 Then they searched Gant's car,
38 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (968).
39 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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finding a gun and cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back
seat.45
Was the search of the car valid? It depends whether Belton
is still good law, or Scalia's new rule has now become the law.
Belton's general rule would clearly authorize the search, as
Gant was a recent occupane6 of the car and the arrest was va-
lid.47 Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Thornton would also au-
thorize the search, as that opinion held that Belton applies
whether or not the officer first initiated contact with the arres-
tee while he was in the car.48 But Scalia's concurrence in Thorn-
ton would not authorize the search, because (1) Gant was out of
reach of the car when the search occurred,49 and (2) there was no
"reason to believe" there was evidence of the crime for which
Gant was arrested (driving with a suspended license) in the
car.50 So Gant presented the Court with a pretty clear choice:
Belton/Thornton or Scalia? They chose Scalia-sort of.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. He conceded
that Belton "has been widely understood to allow a vehicle
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the
time of the search"-blaming Brennan's concurrence for this
view of Belton.51 But that reading was wrong, says Stevens:
"[W]e reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel ra-
tionale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and with-
in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search.,,52 This new rule comports with part of Scalia's
concurrence in Thornton-and Stevens then adopts the rest of
Scalia's concurrence, stating: "Although it does not follow from
Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the ve-
hicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it
" [d.
,. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
47 See id. at 457.
'" See Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004).
,. See id. at 625-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
50 See id. at 632.
5) Ganl, 129 S. Ct. at 1718.
52 [d. at 1719.
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is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.,"53 Stevens goes on to distinguish
Belton on its facts, noting that Belton involved a single outnum-
bered officer while here the arresting officers outnumbered
Gant, and Belton was arrested for a drug offense (so there might
be evidence of that offense in the car) while Gant was arrested
only for driving with a suspended license.54
If Belton did not establish a "bright line rule" permitting
automatic searches of cars incident to the driver's arrest, should
the Court now adopt such a rule? No, says Stevens, because the
threat to privacy is too great. While one has a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in a car, it is not a zero expectation. And
Belton permits police to search other, more private containers
found in the car-such as purses and briefcases.55 No general
rule is needed because the majority's revamped reading of Bel-
ton protects against the arrestee's use of weapons and destruc-
tion of evidence, and other doctrines permit car searches in re-
lated situations: where a passenger poses a danger, and where
there is probable cause to believe there is evidence in the car.56
Once again, Justice Scalia concurred. Since the majority
opinion adopts pretty much his entire position in his Thornton
concurrence, he is pretty satisfied with it--except for its revi-
sionist view of Belton.57 Scalia says Belton cannot be distin-
guished on its facts, because Belton did not care about the
facts-the case applied a general rule. That general rule is
wrong, so Belton (and Thornton) should simply be overruled.58
Justice Alito dissented, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, and (in
part) Breyer. Alito claims that the majority did in fact overrule
Belton and Thornton because-as Scalia also said-those cases
applied a general rule, not dependent on the specific facts of the
case, and application of that general rule to the facts of Gant
53 Id. at 1719 (quoting Tlwrnton, 514 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring».
.. Cant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
55 Id. at 1720.
l>6 Id. at 1721.
57 Cant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58 Id.
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would compel a result opposite to the one reached by the majori-
ty.59 So far, I agree.
Alito then argues that Belton's general rule should be re-
tained, because of stare decisis.60 There is no "special justifica-
tion" for refusing to follow a decided case, for several reasons.61
First, the police relied on the Belton rule, because that rule has
been taught to the police in their training programs.62 (Not too
persuasive, in my view. Just change the training regimen, at
the cost of a few bucks to update the materials-which are up-
dated anyway, to reflect new cases.) Second, no circumstances
have changed since Belton was decided, because "surely it was
well known in 1981 that a person who is taken from a vehicle,
handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car is unlikely to
make it back into his own car to retrieve a weapon or destroy
evidence.,,63 If the Belton majority considered these circums-
tances in adopting the general rule, then all the more reason
they were dead wrong. Third, Alito says that the Belton rule is
not unworkable as, apart from determining whether the occu-
pant was recent, the rule is relatively easy for the police to ap-
ply in most situations. However, it would be even more worka-
ble to have a rule that allows the police to search wherever they
like if they first say "Mother may I," so long as one has no con-
cern for the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Belton rule is not much better than this formulation.
Fourth, Belton has not been undermined by subsequent cases.54
(This time he's right-look at Thornton.) Finally, Alito defends
Belton's reasoning: it represents "only a modest-and quite de-
fensible--extension of Chimel.,,65 Here's where things get inter-
esting.
Alito says that while Chimel limited searches-incident-to-
arrest to the arrestee's grab area, the opinion failed to specify
whether this area is to be measured at the time of the arrest or
59 [d. at 1726-27.
co [d. at 1727-3l(Alito, J., dissenting).
61 [d. at 1728.
G2 See id.
G3 Cant, 129 S. Ct. at 1729.
... [d.
65 [d.
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the time of the search-"but unless the Chimel rule was meant
to be a specialty rule, applicable to only a few unusual cases, the
Court must have intended for this area to be measured at the
time of arrest.'>66 Why? Because usually the cop immediately
handcuffs the arrestee and gets him away from the area of ar-
rest for officer safety.67 For support, Alito cites my study!68
Normally, I am happy as a clam when a judge cites one of
my articles. But this Justice uses my piece to support a conclu-
sion opposite to the one I reached! Alito says that because
"[h]andcuffs were in use in 1969" when Chimel was decided, the
Chimel Court must have known that cops usually secure the
arrestee before searching.69 Therefore, when the Court said the
police may search the "grab area", the Court must have in-
tended to authorize the police to search that area even after the
arrestee is secured.70
My conclusion was quite different.71 I said that Chimel's
scribbling about a search of the grab area was only a dictum
because the issue before the Court in Chimel was the admissibil-
ity of evidence found well outside the grab area.72 A dictum is
worth less than a holding because the facts of the case do not
force the court to think carefully about what they are saying,
and therefore they make mistakes. That is exactly what hap-
pened in Chimel. The Chimel Court simply missed the boat on
grab area because its attention was focused on overruling prior
cases that had permitted the police to search the entire house.
The mistake in Chimelled to the mistakes in Belton and Thorn-
ton, which the Gant majority finally corrected.
And that leads to the most interesting question: will Gant
lead to correction of the Chimel mistake? Alito saw the prob-
lem. Belton was based on the Chimel dictum, which Alito as-
sumes was right and I believe was wrong.73 Because Gant effec-
.. [d. at 1730.
67 [d.
68 [d.
og Cant, 129 S. Ct. at 1730.
70 [d.
71 Moskovitz, supra note 4, at 660.
72 [d.
73 Cant, 129 S. Ct. at 1730.
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tively overrules Belton, Alito says "if we are going to reexamine
Belton, we should also reexamine the reasoning in Chimel on
which Belton rests."74 I agree. Alito also says, "there is no logi-
cal reason why the same rule should not apply to all arrestees."75
Again, I agree. Let's do it right in all cases, not just cases in-
volving car searches. But I disagree with Alito's conclusion. All
arrestees should not have their homes and cars searched inci-
dent-to-arrest when there is no danger they could reach those
places.
IV. THE FUTURE: CAR SEARCHES
The majority opinion in Gant authorizes the police to search
the arrestee's car "incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search.,,76 That
standard should be pretty easy to apply, as courts have had a lot
of experience dealing with the arrestee's reaching distance, or
"grabbable area," at the time of arrest.77 Courts need only apply
those same criteria to where the arrestee was at the time of the
search. As the Court indicates, the issue will rarely arise be-
cause the police will almost always secure the guy and get him
away from his car before they search it.78
The majority in Gant also allows the police to search the ar-
restee's car when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.,,79 This is a
new rule, and it needs elaboration. What does "reasonable to
believe" mean? We've seen probable cause, and we've seen rea-
sonable suspicion. Is "reasonable to believe" something new,
different from these two familiar standards? I doubt it. I expect
courts to equate "reasonable to believe" with the reasonable
" [d. at 1731.
75 [d.
7G [d. at 1719.
77 See, e.g., State v. Robalewski, 418 A2d 817 (R.I. 1980).
78 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
79 [d. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., con-
curring)).
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suspicion standard applied regularly to Terry stopS.80 It is hard
enough to make a non-lawyer police officer tell the difference
between probable cause and reasonable suspicion. It is not fair
to saddle the officer with the burden of understanding a third
standard, knowing where it fits with the other two, and then
requiring the officer to apply that new standard to anew,
unique set of facts with only a few seconds of thought and no
legal opinion from some deputy DA or magistrate to guide him.
And, since he has no search warrant, his good faith effort to ap-
ply this new standard will not protect him from suppression of
the evidence if he gets it wrong.81 It's just too much, and I doubt
that the courts will impose such a burden on him.
I expect courts to apply the "reasonable to believe" standard
on a case-by-case basis, just as they do when assessing the va-
lidity of a Terry-stop. It is possible, however, that courts might
decide that certain categories of "offenses of arrest" always justi-
fy a search of the car. For example, a person arrested for selling
narcotics will often have drugs nearby in his car, so why not
make it easy on the police by establishing a general rule permit-
ting a search of the car without further facts indicating that
there is evidence of sales in the car? Or does this hark back to
Belton's now-disapproved general rule? We will see.
Justice Alito raises another issue: "[W]hy is this type of
search restricted to evidence of the offense of arrest?,,82 Good
question. I can't see why it should be so restricted. The only
justification for reducing the cause needed to search the car be-
low probable cause is the reduced expectation of privacy one has
in a car. If the officer has reasonable suspicion from any source
for believing there is evidence of a crime in the car, the Gant
majority's logic should allow him to search the car.
Alito also asks "why an evidence-gathering search incident
to arrest should be restricted to the passenger compartment.',s3
110 See, e.g., Hiibel v. 6th Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev. Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177
(2004); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
8' See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
81! [d. at 1731.
83 [d.
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Another good question. That restriction is an artifact of Belton,
which seemed to "reason" as follows:
(1) Chimel allowed a search of the area around Dan at the
time of arrest;
(2) If Dan were in the car when arrested, he could then
reach into any place or container in the passenger compartment,
but not into the trunk;
(3) We now extend Chimel to the arrest of a "recent occu-
pant", so we will hypothetically put him back into the car and
assume he was arrested there; and so (4) Voila, the officer can
search the passenger compartment but not the trunk. Very
strange "logic."
As Gant changes the rule and the rationale, the scope of the
allowable search should change too. Under the auto exception,
the Court assumes that the lowered expectation of privacy in a
car applies to the entire car, so if the officer has probable cause
to believe there is evidence in the trunk, he may search the
trunk without a warrant.84 (I do not necessarily agree with this,
as people tend to store private things in a trunk more often than
they store them in the passenger compartment. But the Court
has spoken.) As I said above, I think Gant allows a search of a
car if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe there is evi-
dence of a crime in the car-because of that same lowered ex-
pectation of privacy in a car. If that lowered expectation per-
mits a search of the trunk under the auto exception, it should
permit a search of the trunk under the Gant exception too.
Will Gant lead to a change in the auto exception? Maybe.
The auto exception is one strange animal. It started, I believe,
simply as an application of the "probable cause + exigent cir-
cumstances" exception to the search warrant requirement. The
Fourth Amendment generally requires probable cause, and the
Court generally requires the officer to seek out a magistrate to
issue a search warrant-unless exigent circumstances prevent
the officer from getting a warrant before the evidence is de-
stroyed, hidden, or carried away. The auto exception evolved
into a separate category because usually the fact that the evi-
84 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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dence is in a car means that it can be driven away by someone
before the officer can obtain a warrant; thus the car provides the
exigent circumstances. But not always. Sometimes the car is
disabled or there is no one to drive it away. Even in these cases,
however, the Supreme Court upheld the search.85 The Court
finally explained these anomalies by finding a different basis for
the exception. In United States v. Chadwick,86 the Court said
that the auto exception is based not on the car's inherent mobili-
ty, but on the lowered (but not non-existent) expectation of pri-
vacy in a car.
Fine, but what test should be applied to car searches? Why
probable cause, and not mere reasonable suspicion? Probable
cause is required for an arrest. A Terry-stop intrudes on an ex-
pectation of liberty lower than an arrest, so we don't require
probable cause for a Terry-stop--only reasonable suspicion is
required. By like reasoning, only reasonable suspicion should
be required for a car search, where a lower expectation of priva-
cy also attaches. Justice O'Connor made a similar proposal in
her dissenting opinion in Arizona v. Hicks.87 The majority held
that the police could look under a stereo in a home only if they
had probable cause to believe there was evidence beneath the
stereo. O'Connor assumed that this intrusion on privacy was
enough to constitute a "search," but felt the intrusion was so low
that reasonable suspicion (the Terry standard) should be enough
to justify "a cursory examination of an item in plain view.»88 She
noted that the intrusion in Terry (a forcible stop) was much more
intrusive on privacy than moving the stereo a few inches. The
same reasoning would seem to apply to the search of a car, given
the Court's ''low expectation of privacy" rationale for the auto ex-
ception.
But no. The Court in Chadwick stuck to the old test for the
auto exception: probable cause. Why? Probably from some
sense of deference to stare decisis. The Court wanted to clarify
as See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 436 (1973) (car disabled as result of
an accident); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (search conducted while car
at police station and occupants in custody).
86 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
87 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 333 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 334.
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the basis for the rule, but preferred not to tinker with the rule
itself.
But Gant has changed the picture. Car searches now are
permitted on mere reasonable suspicion-at least right after an
arrest and where the reasonable suspicion is connected to "the
offense of arrest. "89 But why these limitations? How does the
fact of arrest affect the driver's or owner's lowered expectation
of privacy in the car? Not much. One is just as troubled (or not
troubled) by an officer's search of one's car whether one has
been arrested or not. Scalia, however, believes that the arrest
does matter, as it "distinguishes the arrestee from society at
large," and "it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime
is most likely to be found where the suspect was apprehended.'>9O
Well, it will be "illogical" in some situations, and the "reasonable
to believe" test should be adequate to distinguish the logical
from the illogical.
The upshot of all this: if the Court gets around to deleting
these restrictions, it might as well use its resulting new rule to
replace (or redefine) the auto exception with a revamped Gant
exception. The Gant majority characterized its new rule as a
revised Belton rule. Belton placed its rule under the search-
incident-to-arrest exception. The Gant majority opinion ap-
proved of Belton, so it looks like a revised Belton rule, belonging
under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. But it really does
not belong under that exception because only rarely will Chi-
mel's justifications underlying the search-incident-to-arrest ex-
ception apply to searches of a car incident to an arrest (because
the arrestee will almost never be able to reach the car for wea-
pons or evidence when the officer searches the car).
Instead, the guts of Gant are its new rule permitting the of-
ficer to search the car when it is "reasonable to believe" there is
in the car evidence of the "offense of arrest." So the focus is now
on the likelihood that there is evidence of a crime in the car-
which is exactly the focus of the auto exception. There is not
much need for both, so I predict (speculate, actually) that when
89 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
90 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630.
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the Supreme Court gets around to deleting or modifying the re-
strictions that Justice Alito criticized, the new "updated" Gant
rule will displace the old auto exception.
V. CAR SEARCHES-SOME HYPOTHETICALS
Let's play with a few hypos.
1. Officer Copp stops Dan for speeding. Copp runs a war-
rant check, which brings up a warrant to arrest Dan for selling
cocaine. The warrant says nothing about the date, place, or cir-
cumstances of the alleged cocaine sale. Copp handcuffs Dan
and locks him in the patrol car. Does Gant allow Copp to search
Dan's car for cocaine? I don't think so. Without more, what
Copp knows does not make it "reasonable to believe" (in my
view, this means reasonable suspicion) that Dan was selling
cocaine out of his car or transporting it in his car.
2. Same facts, but when Copp searches Dan's clothes inci-
dent to the valid arrest on the warrant, Copp finds a pound of
cocaine and $10,000 in Dan's pockets. Now may Copp search
Dan's car? Clearly he could do so under Gant, as Copp has plen-
ty of reasonable suspicion to believe Dan might be transporting
in the car "evidence of the crime of arrest" (sale of cocaine).
But Copp probably doesn't need Gant to justify the search.
The sum of all these facts seems to add up to probable cause to
believe there is evidence of cocaine sales in the car, so the auto
exception authorizes the search.
3. Same facts as #1, but Copp finds only a small baggie of
cocaine in Dan's pockets. May he search the car? Now the sum
of the facts does not seem to add up to probable cause to believe
there is evidence in the car, so the auto exception would not ap-
pear to work. But I think Gant would authorize the search, be-
cause the warrant for selling cocaine plus the discovery of the
baggie of cocaine shows that Dan is regularly involved with co-
caine and so there is at least a 25% chance (?) that there are
more drugs, sales money, paraphernalia, etc., in the car.
May Copp search the trunk, or just the passenger compart-
ment? Because the Gant majority did not overrule Belton, it
seems that Gant authorizes Copp to search only the passenger
compartment of Dan's car. Justice Alito has problems with this,
2009] THE ROAD TO REASON 199
and so do I. As I indicated above, if Gant's reasonable suspicion
standard is justified by the lowered expectation of privacy one
has in a car, that should justify a search of the trunk too.91
4. Copp stops Dan for speeding, and the warrant check
shows a warrant for driving with a suspended license. Copp's
search of Dan's clothing turns up a small baggie of cocaine and
$5,000. This is a tough one. I don't think this adds up to proba-
ble cause to believe there are more drugs or related items in the
car (so the auto exception would not apply), but this might be
enough for reasonable suspicion.
But this search would not be for "evidence of the crime of
arrest,"92 so the Gant majority opinion would not seem to permit
it. Justice Alito questioned this, and so do I, as indicated
above.93 It seems that this limitation on car searches incident to
arrest was only dicta in Gant, so maybe the Court will reconsid-
er it when the right facts come before it.
VI. THE FUTURE: HOME SEARCHES
As I said above,94 I think the Court should reexamine the
Chimel dictum allowing the police to search the "grabbable
area" around the arrestee at the time of arrest--even though he
is nowhere near that area at the time of the search. As my ear-
lier study shows, police officers are instructed to get the guy
secured and out of that area immediately after arrest-and that
is what they usually do. There is no danger of any reach for
weapons or evidence in that area, so no search should be al-
lowed under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
The logic of Gant's majority opinion (and certainly Justice
Scalia's concurrence) supports this analysis, and I predict that
this is exactly what the Court will do when it accepts a case pre-
senting these facts in a home search. That case will probably
9' The Court has extended the auto exception to include containers found in the car.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). This goes too far, in my view, because your
expectation of privacy in your suitcase found in your trunk is much higher than, say, a
jacket found on your back seat.
!l2 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
93 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
0< See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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resemble United States v. Turner,95 where the police arrested
Turner in a room and saw a gun next to him. They handcuffed
him and took him out of the room. Then they returned and
searched the room where the arrest took place, finding a rifle,
ammunition, and cocaine.96
The Court of Appeals upheld this search-even though
Turner could not reach that room when the search occurred-
because (1) the area searched was within Turner's reach when
he was arrested, and (2) the decision to remove Turner from the
room was justified by the officers' concern for their safety, as
they had already found a gun near Turner when he was ar-
rested.97
In his Thornton concurrence, Justice Scalia rejected this
sort of reasoning, stating:
[C]onducting a Chimel search is not the Government's
right; it is an exception-justified by necessity-to a rule that
would otherwise render the search unlawful. If "sensible police
procedures" require that suspects be handcuffed and put in
squad cars, then police should handcuff suspects, put them in
squad cars, and not conduct the search.98
Scalia will find it pretty hard not to apply the same analy-
sis to a home search. Indeed, the argument for limiting
searches-incident-to-arrest in the home is even stronger than in
a car, because the Court (including Justice Scalia) seems to go
out of its way to protect the sanctity of the home.99
Scalia convinced a majority in Gant, and I think he will do
so again when a case like Turner hits the Court. Will the Court
include the new wrinkle Scalia added in Thornton and adopted
by the majority in Gant-allowing the police to search the grab-
bable area when it is "reasonable to believe" that the area con-
tains "evidence of the crime of arrest"? I don't think so. While
the recent justices have not enforced the Fourth Amendment
nearly as much as earlier justices (e.g., on the Warren Court),
95 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1990)
96 Turner, 926 F.2d at 885-86.
9' [d.
96 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Ariwna v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in both of these cases.
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they have been quite protective when it comes to home
searches. lOo Permitting the police to search the home (the entire
home?) on mere reasonable suspicion-without a warrant or
exigent circumstances-merely because there was an arrest in
the home goes much too far. The lower expectation of privacy in
cars might justify this new Gant exception, but it would not
seem to justify an intrusion on the privacy of the home. And, for
good measure, we don't want to encourage the police to arrange
home arrests in order to take advantage of a Gant-like excep-
tion.
CONCLUSION
We've come a long way. Belton (and Thornton) undermined
the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy by setting out a
general rule that bore no resemblance to what the police usually
do in the real world. Gant brought the Court back on the track
of rationality and realism. There are still several kinks in the
opinion that need straightening, but now that the Court is back
on the road to reason, that shouldn't be too hard.
100 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
